Baggrund

Velkommen til.

De oprindelige tanker her er nedskrevet i 2004- 2005 efter at have været leget med 1997- 2003 og delvist testet på Moesbork, for at formulere dem til forbedrelse af Asks indsats ved at udnytte den enkelte bedst muligt. Og for at overbevise de tøvende.

Mange var nemlig bange for at vi ved at benytte faste enheder ville svække vores indsats med andre end vores kampgruppe-partner. Dette viste sig ikke at være tilfældet, men i sidste ende blev dette, der resulterede i Dyregrupperne 2005- 2007, gennemført fordi Martin Seliger og jeg valgte at ignorere indsigelserne og i samarbejde med Mikkel som træningsofficer gøre det.

Der er siden sket andre ting og udviklinger, men meget af dette er stadig relevant og ikke mindst brugbart for andre. Nogle af tankerne undervejs i udviklingen da bolden for alvor begyndte at rulle nåede aldrig at blive skrevet ned, men disse er i hvert fald gemt.

Sunday 1 October 2017

Palle’s Way of Viking War


We must always aim to annihilate the enemy; to kill him with as few losses as possible. This is best achieved from behind, where they cannot defend themselves and attack us. Hence the desired end state is to outmanoeuvre the enemy, to kill his reserves and commanders so the main line is isolated and insecure and alone, and then to catch them in a kesselschlacht and kill them, hemming them in, will also hinder their ability to fight.
On an open battlefield we should thus always aim to flank or double envelop the enemy, if for no other reason; to concentrate force locally in a schwerpunkt and defeat him with local superiority while holding elsewhere. Yet the desired result must be to flank, and surround him in a kessel and annihilate him.

On a closed battlefield like Moesgaard or where the enemy’s flanks are otherwise anchored safely, the possibility to flank him is not present. We must thus create a hole in the enemy line by concentrating force in a schwerpunkt (Klotzen nicht Kleckern), punch through, and penetrate his rear areas as described above, while at the same time rolling up his flanks on the “shoulder” of the penetration point. This Schwerpunkt is chosen by the commander, but- and this is important- any warrior who sees the opportunity to break through locally or create a Schwerpunkt locally, must always do so at his own initiative. But more on that later.

In any case, if we are to achieve a breakthrough, we cannot do so defensively and passively. We must show initiative and aggression under any and all circumstances, wars are not won by defending, and a group with well-trained warriors must employ them to the fullest. As our standard is fairly high and the expectations on us usually high as well, we would be foolish to not attack. Loitering is not for us, we must attack and kill the enemy, not just stand around waiting for others to decide the fight or the enemy to make a mistake. We must attack him, create a favourable situation for us and punch through to catch him in a Kesselschlacht. Or die epicly in the effort.

This aggression and initiative demands cooperation with and trust in your brothers-in-arms on the line. To cooperate effectively makes us much stronger than an equal number of individuals. Allow me to elaborate.
By cooperating with others, your back is covered in most situations as you stand on line, facing the enemy, to avoid being killed from behind. Equally, on a line you should worry less about cross-strikes coming in from your front sides, as your mates will parry these for you and you for them. These are otherwise dangerous, as the human eye has a harder time noticing peripheral movement and you cannot see attacks from behind, while you easily spot the enemy opposite you moving and striking. You must thus parry these and direct them away from your friends next to you. This cannot be stressed enough. And with your back and sides covered, you can focus on protecting your front and stop the enemy’s attacks against your friends as well as- most importantly- killing him and his friends. So the protection from your friends allow you freedom to feint, distract, confuse and kill the enemy in cooperation with your friends. Creating openings for the fighters right and left of you, for as mentioned; peripheral vision has a harder time spotting movements than frontal vision, so cross-strikes are more effective. This is enhanced also, by the frontal coverage of the shield, which extends to a lesser extent to the front’s sides. And can be entirely removed by cooperation with your mates to attract the enemy focus and feint and lure the enemy shield out of the way for your cross-strike.
Hence it is most effective to fight in cooperation to lure the direct opposition’s attention and focus away from your mates to the left while you ready yourself to strike the enemy to your right. Most people are right-handed and you will thus have a larger uncovered area to strike on their right side than on their shield side, just as your attacks to your right leave less of an opening than to the left. If you use a one-handed weapon that is. Your enemy will thus often briefly face many weapons and strikes as you and the warriors to your sides cooperate on the line to create small “Triangles” or local Schwerpunkts flexibly in your surrounding and kill the enemy with this brief local superiority by cross-strikes.
Often this required cooperation to briefly focus several weapons on a single target happens by coincidence, at other times it is the result of communication. What we should aim for, is that it must always be the result of communication, and ultimately to know your group-mates so well, that the communication can be silent or in very few words. This is one of the strongest arguments for settled and organised groups; most of us simply do not know the other 70 fighters so well that we can cooperate effectively with them even if we communicate.
We must also not forget the psychological effects to fight in a group of friends you know well. Not just do most people feel stronger and safer as a group, but the knowledge of your mates’ style and fighting spirit and the sense of esprit de corps must never be underestimated.
So to sum up;
If we cannot flank or envelop an enemy, we must weaken him from the point of contact by effective cooperation on the line, for a vulnerability for a Schwerpunkt can be created and exploited for a breakthrough to kill his rear area, surround him and annihilate him in a Kesselschlacht. But the essential thing is initiative, flexibility and aggression in cooperation with your friends to kill the enemies in front of you. To step into the Danger-Zone and never let up and “snipe”, but to at least appear active and threatening, striking and feinting all the time. To keep up the initiative by pressure and aggression and never let the enemy rest before he is dead.

How to achieve this initiative in Viking Fighting?
Generally low-level leadership is essential in our fighting, the noise prevents orders from higher-ups to reach the small units in time, the commander may not be able to see local developments and often his role is limited to committing reserves. Often even small group commanders have to run op behind fighters and touch them and shout in their ear to get noticed. And leaders can fall; it is a very popular tactic to take out Igor when fighting the Poles. And non-reserve units waiting for orders will often squander the chance to win the battle. A few years ago Ulfhednir reacting to an Ask outflank saved their side, while the day before Ask threw away both its initiative and the possibility for crushing the enemy flank by procrastinating and then withdrawing while an immediate rush on the enemy from the start would have annihilated the flank in front of them and started to roll up the centre. Hence, units where both low-level leaders and warriors have the ability to employ Auftragstaktik has a greater potential to succeed. But this demands awareness, tactical knowledge, knowledge of the plan, and boldness. Motivation to undertake the necessary action to succeed, without blood-rush or ego taking over, but with calculated aggression, and Fingerspitzengefühl to know when to do so.


It is an old maxim of war that every plan changes or goes out the window (at the latest) at the first contact with the enemy. He rarely acts as you predict and it is impossible in practice to plan for every variable of a battle. Situations in war change and they change fast. “War is the province of uncertainty” as Clausewitz writes. That chaos is almost impossible to control, so you should instead adapt and embrace it, channel it and use it to beat the enemy. The German Way of War is to do exactly that and the tool they use is commonly known as Auftragstaktik or “Mission Command”
Auftragstaktik means that every leader down to the lowest level has the freedom to evaluate the situation on the ground and then change his orders if he meets a changed situation. So he will evaluate the situation, match it to his orders, then adapt or even change his orders to suit the situation. For example; if I send you out to get me coffee and cake and there is no more cake, and you get me coffee and cookies instead. You have evaluated the situation and matched it to your orders and found that they were impossible to achieve, and done the next best thing- without having to waste time going back to ask me, time in which the last cookies and coffee could also be gone.
Like Blitzkrieg, it is not an expression the Germans used themselves; they talked instead about “Selbständichkeit”, and while Auftragstaktik means you have the freedom to carry out your orders as you wish, Selbständichkeit means that you are free to change them. If we continue the example from before with the coffee and cake, you get out there and you notice there is cake, but there is also chocolate pudding, and you know I love chocolate pudding. You should change your order and bring me back coffee and chocolate pudding. That is Selbständichkeit. You have changed your orders without asking me- cause the chocolate pudding would be gone when you came back from asking- but you have succeeded because you know what I like. You have shown Selbständichkeit and initiative. And because you succeeded in handing me something I love, you are not punished for going against my orders. Had you brought me cheese because you like cheese, then you would have. Or in military terms; if a young lt. is tasked by advancing to a river crossing and up a hill overlooking it to dig in and hold that, then notices the bridge is undefended, he should change his orders and cross the bridge before the enemy can blow it or dig in on the other side. He will be praised for having shown selbständichkeit and initiative and secured a river crossing, not punished for changing his orders. Had he come upon a strong enemy on the other side, tried to cross and suffered heavy losses- he would be severely punished; you are allowed to go against or change orders if you succeed in improving your side’s situation, punished severely for failing in the face of orders.
Hence, the subordinates - down to the youngest private - must know what is desirable for his organisation, without having to ask. You only gain this through thorough education and training- through having thinking soldiers.



How to protect your mate against cross-strikes when you use a spear? There is only one way, especially with a one-hander that should always own an opposing two-hander; attack him as soon as he even thinks of moving. You have a nice shield to hide behind and can hardly be hit by twohanders, but you can step into and kill them. So do not fear; hit or threaten him as soon as he tries to strike. We must remember this or we must have more swords and axes on the line.


What do these two have in common?
Both go to great length to have a fit body- not a pumped body, but a fit, agile and strong one. The Germans believed that a strong, fit body added to both bravery and self-confidence, and thus the “selbständichkeit” and initiative of the individual commander. Ongoing research by the US Army seems to confirm this. So; keep fit!


Leaders must possess initiative, aggression, tactical skill, timing and serve to serve; their command should not be about them and self-serving, but they about their command and unselfishly serving.