Moesgaard 2017

Now, a week after our return from Moesgaard, after confirming memories with pictures and videos, it is time for a preliminary analysis of the battles; the largest yet in its 40 years of history, with 610 warriors participating.


As I am no longer a commander, I have limited view of the entire battlefield and will thus by necessity focus on Ask. I will try to include what I can of the rest of the battles, and will gladly hear the comments of anyone who had a better view and idea of what was supposedly happening.


You should also all beware that I try to be an objective observer and analyst, so that any criticism or suggestions for improvements are not meant as degrading (I am no diplomat), but as a possible help; right or wrong, for I also am not infallible.


For a description of the terrain, see here, and the pictures below. In combination with the weather, this would prove significant.

Briefly, the best viking reenactment fighters globally in the "Western Style" fighting meet as part of Moesgaard Viking Market for a week every year. Here we train and exchange new methods and ideas (and drink and boast and wench) during the four days leading up to the weekend, with Friday being reserved for a division into two sides of equal strength and a few test fights, then culminating during the weekend with four large battles and four "circles" (every man for himself in a huge melee till only one is left standing). The winners of these battles and circles are the unofficial world champions for a year. And just as not all individual fighetrs are equally strong, not all groups are- not to mention size as they range from one to 117 present fighters- so it is a difficult task; not least because three large and two medium/small groups are usually considered stronger than the others.

These are in order of size:

1. Ask (Aarhus, my group), 57 fighters present.
2. Ulfhednir (Cph, our best friends and worst rivals), appr. 35 figthers.
3. Einwik (Germany, I can never spell it right), also appr. 35 fighters
4. Trek (Holland), appr. 15 fighters.
5. Atgeir (Sjælland), appr. 15 fighters.

 The Battlefield

1. The Battlefield itself
2. The reconstructed Stone Age Burial House
3. The "Knee" a small hillock.
4. Entrance for the Forest Side
5. Entrance for the Beach Side
6.  the small red dots are photo 

Entire market and combat area

• A is the beach side muster-site
• B is the forest side muster-site.
• C + beach is the market
• D is the audience area during the shows

 The exit from the forest side muster-site (B)

 First part of the march route from the forest muster, 

appr. from adge of photo above.

 The hill seen distantly on the photo above.

 And the path down from it...

 And down to its worst part

 Muddy tracks, slippery authentic soles

 The soles close up

 Entrance from forest, view towards the Burial House

 further up the field from the forest

 From the small "knee" on the field and down across it at it widest point

 The same location towards the beach

 From the beach entrance towards the burial House

 Same location, towards the beach, firm but sligthly narrow path.

the bridge across the stream seen below 

is at a 90 degree angle on this path, down where the people are loitering

 The march route from the beach side mustering point to the path above. 

Firm, nice gravel.

With the sides split, Ask was on one side, with the other four strong groups as our opponents, with us we had the huge Army of Jomsborg (117 fighters, from subgroups of the same major group spread across various nations, but thus not used to fight in a large group) and small groups from Ireland, Scandinavia - including Denmark- and Germany (that I know of, there were likely more groups I do not know) of varying strength. On the other side our opponents also included Icelanders, other Danes and Germans (again that I know off).
There were Austrians, Italians and French as well, but I am uncertain where they fought. 
Judging from the week's fighting and our estimation of sides, things looked bleak for Ask, our main ally was not used to fight as a group and as we did not actually feel our best we expected to loose, but to give it our very- VERY best before we fell. Our beloved and hated Wolves (Ulfhednir) spent Friday evening celebrating their impending victory, or at least felt very secure they would win.

Our side won the contest (often tug-of-war) on Friday to choose where to muster in the first battle, and our Norwegian General decided to muster on the Beach Side.

Saturday Morning Battle

The plan was to deploy Ask on the left and use us as a hammer to grind away the enemy, while the rest of our line provided a hammer. Then when we had thinned out the enemy, the Norwegian groups allied as Nord would break through as our reserve.

However, as Clausewitz noted; "war is the province of uncertainty" and our reserve never showed up. I hear from one of the Norwegians that The Army of Jomsborg deployed in such density that Nord had to close a hole between them and the other groups in the front line, but as The Army was left of and behind us as we pushed forwards strongly, I cannot verify this- in light of later events, it sounds likely though.
So now we were supposed to attrit the enemy, create a hole and break through it. And it started out slow. There are pros and cons to our numerous one-handed spears, and at the start it seemed to me as bannerbearer that we were not pushing strongly and offensively enough. Our enemies had deployed only one of their strong groups, either Trek or Atgeir (I cannot recall), against us and were pushing hard on our far left in front of the audience (I am as yet unaware of their plan). The battle was thus quite Hellene with both right flanks pushing hard. Eventually we broke through the enemy and started both rolling up the enemy and "liberating" our left flank by running up (and uphill) behind and round the Burial House and hitting them in the back.

We had no left flank left though, it had collapsed, and as we engaged, most of Einwik turned with others (I presume reserves) and we faced a really hard faight against strong enemies who we love to fight as they are a hell of a challenge, but who we can usually not kill fast, and who can sometimes beat us. This time we pushed through them though, our right flank maintaining its momentum and pushing forwards. The battle had turned 180 degrees and some of thought we were now done, but I looked up and to the left as we pushed through their remnants and saw Ulfhednir and their remaining friends down where we started, having killed our last friends and forming up to hit us in the flank. Ask and our surviving friends faced a really hard and equal struggle yet if we were to pull victory from the grasp of defeat.

Here are some of them in a posed picture, nice guys- really- but not what you want to see coming at you after fighting through the enemy line twice and running uphill.

Yet our blood was up, we had momentum and we would let nothing stop us. We rallied as we moved downhill to fight them and as the remnants of two major Danish group, reinforced by our surviving friends faced off they probably stood no chance; their expected certain victory had turned into a hard fight and our expected defeat had turned into a slaughter of anyone who faced us.

It was a hard fight still, but eventually the heroic Wolves fell and the "King" of that side was killed to the cheers of the audience. The "dead" were resurrected by Odin, and the following "Circle" was won by Thomas Smith from Ulfhednir (training and living with us in Aarhus though), they are very good individual fighters too.

So snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, Ask and our side were happy. We believe, as one of our Norwegian allies said it; that it was Ask winning that battle. We often do well, and the tactic is often that we are to win the battle, which is a bit risky, for if we do bad (as happens) or the enemy finds a way to neutralise us our line is also neutralised and very few viking reenactment groups practice Auftragstaktik, though I try to change that.

Palle's Workshop on Auftragstaktik for Ask International Training 2017 - Unedited, unclarified

Dayplan

·         Intro

·         Theory

o   Historical background

o   Principles

o   Examples

o   Uses in viking

·         Exercises

·         Evaluation

Who am I?

Focus: ”Auftragstaktik”

Goals of participation: The participants should gain insight in Auftragstaktik, its advantages and uses in Viking Reenactment fighting.

Litterature:

-Robert M. Citino; ”The German Way of War”

-Jörg Muth; “Command Culture”

-Mark Gerges; "An Engineer Assualt Team Crosses the Meuse, May 1940", http://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/SixteenCasesOfMissionCommand.pdf

Prerequisites for participation: Basic understanding of Line Fighting and ”The Little Tactic” (see Danish post further down). Keywords are Cooperation/coordination, flexibility and initiative – which is only achievable by communication!

Three basic Group Circles.

Did you notice any pattern in the command and control, and coordination in these?

Quick round; Name the three most effective militaries you can think of historically

Brainstorm: What characterizes The Wehrmact and its predecessors? IE; what is “The German Way of War”?

Historical background

What is “Auftragstaktik”? Your characterization of the Wehrmacht was wrong and it rests on stereotypes. Make no mistakes, the Wehrmacht and its predecessors had iron-hard discipline, but not “Kadaver-Disciplin”; no, The German Way of War is characterized by “Auftragstaktik”, or “Mission Command”. That means a freedom of command for the responsible officer to carry out the mission as he best sees fit. With no micromanagement from above and detailed orders. He is responsible in all ways. Your commander does not tell you how to take a hill, he leaves that to you, for you know the situation and your men, and as we all know any plan changes at first contact with the enemy, and you must have the freedom to then change it and carry it out as you see fit. The Germans did not themselves talk of “Auftragstaktik and the above is also a misrepresentation of it, but for now it shall suffice- I shall go more in depth later.

The central word in The German Way of War is not Blitzkrieg, a term coined by a London correspondent I Poland 1939, but Bewegungskrieg. And it goes back far further than the little Austrian Corporal, back even further than Friederich der Grösse. But it was him that was arguable the master of it and who formulated it. Prussia, and before that the small Duchy of Brandenburg that became Prussia, was a small, impoverished realm on the outskirts of Europe surrounded by larger enemies such as Russia, Sweden and the Habsburg Empire, and slightly further away the strongest country in Europe at the time; France. And with no defensible borders. Prussia would always loose wars of attrition or defensive wars against these larger enemies and to fight one was a slow way of losing. Hence, Prussia would have to beat their enemies fast. Their wars needed to be “Kurz und Wieves” as Friederich himself put it. This required the Prussian army to outmaneuver its enemies with the goal of fighting a “Kesselschlact”; surrounding the enemy and hitting him from all sides with extreme violence- no starving him out as that took too long; surround and destroy. This cannot be achieved by defending, and, again quoting Friederich; “The most certain way of ensuring victory is to march briskly and in good order against the enemy, always endeavouring to gain ground” or “The Prussian Army always attacks- we would be foolish to give up the advantages of attacking; with well-trained infantry and bold and aggressive commanders”. And up to the very end of WW2, the Germans would have an offensive mindset; trying to defeat their enemies by attacking them rather than to bleed them dry and inevitably very swiftly counterattacking if forced out of a position. And always trying to achieve Bewegungskrieg where their superior training and leadership would outweigh their enemies’ numerical superiority: All the French, British and Soviet armies smashed by the Wehrmacht in 1940-41-42 were superior in numbers and tanks, they lost anyway. The Americans learned the hard way at Kasserine- the Brits had warned saying literally, “You got to beware when fighting the Germans… they are faster than you are used to when on exercises”. These front-loaded campaigns would aim to annihilate the enemy fast, and you had to learn fast while fighting them, for you often did not get a second chance- only the Soviets and Brits did, because they had places to hide and learn.

The problem of Bewegungskrieg before invention of radio was communication and coordination of troops and even with radio, there is a limit to how much one person can control. Hence, Prussia’s kings would rely on aggressive and independently minded commanders, and they on aggressively minded subordinates, etc., and provide them with the same training or staff officers with the same training from the Kriegsakademie: At its best this combined independence, aggression and intellect. Commanders making a beeline towards the enemy to outmanoeuvre and beat him in a Kesselschlact would know that their colleagues would be doing the same. The most famous example of this, and the ideal of later German officers, was Friederich d. Grosse’s hyper-aggressive and hyper-independent cavalry commander Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz, who at The Battle of Zorndorf 25-08-1758 when ordered on his head by Friedrich himself to attack and restore the left flank for the third time instead of waiting, replyed; “After the battle the King may do with my head as he please, but during the battle he should let me use it to serve him as I see fit”. Not something you say to your king, but von Seydlitz did and he won the battle decisively when his “Fingerspitzengefühl” told him it was time to attack. He was on the spot, he knew the situation and his men and “felt” the enemy, and his timing was perfect because of it. And the Prussian-German officer corps was trained to lead from the front, feel the enemy (fingerspitzengefühl), act independently and be extremely aggressive, as you can see below.

So to sum up;

1.    The Prussian Army always attacks – Aggression

2.    Feel the battle; the situation and the enemy – Fingerspitzengefühl

3.    Dare act boldly and independently without waiting for orders - Auftragstaktik

Discuss in pairs; Pros and Cons of The German Way of War

Now, let us get to the details of Auftragstaktik

It is an old maxim of war that every plan changes or goes out the window (at the latest) at the first contact with the enemy. He rarely acts as you predict and it is impossible in practice to plan for every variable of a battle. Situations in war change and they change fast. “War is the province of uncertainty” as Clausewitz writes. That chaos is almost impossible to control, so you should instead adapt and embrace it, channel it and use it to beat the enemy. The German Way of War is to do exactly that and the tool they use is commonly known as Auftragstaktik or “Mission Command”

Auftragstaktik means that every leader down to the lowest level has the freedom to evaluate the situation on the ground and then change his orders if he meets a changed situation. So he will evaluate the situation, match it to his orders, then adapt or even change his orders to suit the situation. For example; if I send you out to get me coffee and cake and there is no more cake, and you get me coffee and cookies instead. You have evaluated the situation and matched it to your orders and found that they were impossible to achieve, and done the next best thing- without having to waste time going back to ask me, time in which the last cookies and coffee could also be gone.

Like Blitzkrieg, it is not an expression the Germans used themselves; they talked instead about “Selbständichkeit”, and while Auftragstaktik means you have the freedom to carry out your orders as you wish, Selbständichkeit means that you are free to change them. If we continue the example from before with the coffee and cake, you get out there and you notice there is cake, but there is also chocolate pudding, and you know I love chocolate pudding. You should change your order and bring me back coffee and chocolate pudding. That is Selbständichkeit. You have changed your orders without asking me- cause the chocolate pudding would be gone when you came back from asking- but you have succeeded because you know what I like. You have shown Selbständichkeit and initiative. And because you succeeded in handing me something I love, you are not punished for going against my orders. Had you brought me cheese because you like cheese, then you would have. Or in military terms; if a young lt. is tasked by advancing to a river crossing and up a hill overlooking it to dig in and hold that, then notices the bridge is undefended, he should change his orders and cross the bridge before the enemy can blow it or dig in on the other side. He will be praised for having shown selbständichkeit and initiative and secured a river crossing, not punished for changing his orders. Had he come upon a strong enemy on the other side, tried to cross and suffered heavy losses- he would be severely punished; you are allowed to go against or change orders if you succeed in improving your side’s situation, punished severely for failing in the face of orders.

Discuss in groups; what is Auftragstaktik; its most important elements? What are the three most important requirements for Auftragstaktik? Using a Kriegsakademie dialectic principle; the least experienced comments first, then second-least, etc.

Elements of Auftragstaktik

·         Initiative

·         Independence

·         Experience/Training

·         Knowledge of situation and goals

·         Fingerspitzengefühl

“Innere Führung”

In order to even attempt Auftragstaktik, you need also have “Innere Führung” or the practitioners of it will not practice it, but just lean back. Innere Führung is ambition, motivation, willpower, drive, the wish to excel not for yourself and on your own, but as part of a whole, a unit, an army, a nation. The wish for it to succeed – Sulten?

Tactical skill

There is another essential part of this. For if the subordinate does not know his leader’s goals and has no tactical skill, he cannot show initiative and carry it out- you cannot get me chocolate pudding if you do not know I like it. German leaders from 1919 and forwards were all trained to lead three levels above themselves. That meant they knew the wishes and goals on a much higher level- and it meant they could easily replace their superiors; German officers, leading from the front, suffered extremely heavy casualties, but due to the training and Five-Points Orders, that never stopped their units.

Discuss in groups; Pros and Cons of Auftragstaktik? Using a Kriegsakademie dialectic principle; the least experienced comments first, then second-least, etc.

How one man won The Battle of France

An example of Auftragstaktik.

Fall Gelb was the German codeword for their attack on France and the Low Countries. Briefly, the original intension was to copy the Schlieffen Plan of 1914 by attacking through Belgium and along the coast. The Allied were expecting this however, and planned to reinforce Balgium with their best units, and gained certainty for the plan through a German officer emergency landing in Belgium.

However, Hitler did not much like the plan, but was not interfering with his Generals as he did later, but one of these; Erich von Manstein were not keen on the plan either. He had another idea; one that would give the army group he was Chief of Staff in a greater role. And he kept pestering his superiors with this until they got so fed up that he got promoted out of the area to silence him. He gained a third star and was sent to Poland to command. On the way he had a meeting with Hitler, and the rest is history…. The Germans used his proposed “Sichelschnitt” to cut off the elite of the Allied armies in Belgium and won The Battle of France in ten days! A feat their fathers had not been able to in four years. Ten days to defeat the strongest army in the world at the time, and doing it while outnumbered and with worse tanks. The French lost their best divisions, and the BEF was sent scurrying back to their island- had there been no Channel to hide behind, they would have run all the way to Scotland.

Central for the success of this plan was the mobile Pz-Divisions getting across the Meuse at Sedan and push to The Channel. But Sedan was heavily fortified by bunkers with mgs and supported by artillery, and all the bridges were blown. If the Germans were to be stopped and the meatgrinder of 1914- 1918 repeated, this was the place. It was defended by second-rate reserve divisions, but they were dug in well and if they could hold to nightfall, the next day, the high-quality 3^rd Army would reinforce or counterattack. The Germans were not stopped and Western civilization stood on the verge of destruction, but initially they succeeded, until Auftragstaktik beat them.

The Germans were stopped dead in 5 of 6 crossings and the elite 1^st Pz Div and GD Regiment met very heavy resistance and could not expand their bridgehead. Until…

Part of the reason they were not stopped was Sturmpioneer Oberfeldwebel (Assault Engineer Staff Sergeant); Walther Rubart, who crossed the river with 7 men in two dinghies as the only men of 10th Pz division to succeed. They destroyed the French bunker firing on them, then took stock of the situation. They were supposed to go left, but he started to destroy the French fortifications to his right- against his order! He was being shot at from the right, saw the heaviest resistance against crossing there, and changed his orders to fit the situation and overall plan. And he eventually ended up cutting the French defenders fighting against GD’s advance off. He lost all men and had to go back for more satchel charges and reinforcements several times, but he opened the way for the 1st PZ div and GD. He showed Selbständichkeit and Innere Führung; seeing the necessity and not hesitating or waiting for orders. 1^st Pz and GD under Hermann von Balck then advanced, and noticing that 2nd Pz had not crossed as evening fell, advanced against orders to take up the defensive positions 2^nd PZ were supposed to and dug in to meet a counterattack. The French, awaiting orders and not showing Selbständichkeit, could not react fast to the crossing and showed up late, the 3^rd army thus ran into Germans in their assembly positions and had to withdraw with heavy losses. Balck, showing Selbständichkeit, had saved the bridgehead. The contrast could not be greater; the Germans, trained to be selbständich and aggressive and move fast, excelled in the chaos. The French with no such training, reacted slow and were always a step behind the Germans. The lack of radios only made this worse.

That is what I aim for us to reach. That every single warrior has the tactical skill and training, and motivation to do what is necessary for the group’s success without awaiting orders, to seize the day. But also to be able to spot and defend a crisis point.

Feldwebel Walther Rubarth: 07-06-1913 – 26-09-1941

Uses in Viking Reenactment fighting.

Generally low-level leadership is essential in our fighting, the noise prevents orders from higher-ups to reach the small units in time, the commander may not be able to see local developments and often his role is limited to committing reserves. Often even small group commanders have to run op behind fighters and touch them and shout in their ear to get noticed. And leaders can fall; it is a very popular tactic to take out Igor when fighting the Poles. And non-reserve units waiting for orders will often squander the chance to win the battle. A few years ago Ulfhednir reacting to an Ask outflank saved their side, while the day before Ask threw away both its initiative and the possibility for crushing the enemy flank by procrastinating and then withdrawing while an immediate rush on the enemy from the start would have annihilated the flank in front of them and started to roll up the centre. Hence, units where both low-level leaders and warriors have the ability to employ Auftragstaktik has a greater potential to succeed. But this demands awareness, tactical knowledge, knowledge of the plan, and boldness. Motivation to undertake the necessary action to succeed, without blood-rush or ego taking over, but with calculated aggression, and Fingerspitzengefühl to know when to do so.

Discussion in groups; How can we train the necessary ability?

Exercises:

-“Rundetrunte”; everybody will try commanding at least once, preferably more.

-Trainer-Lines; One line makes a plan, but the other (trainers) give them an opportunity to exploit. Brief feedback after each fight; what was the weakness? How was it exploited?

Walk and Talk; reflections – how can I employ Auftragstaktik? What can I do to further it in my group?

Why do I show a picture of these two handsome and smiling chaps? Apart from the fact that they are handsoms, smiling, nice and we all like them, so it is always a pleasure to look at them?

They keep fit! Not "lifting-heavy-stuff-fit", but fit as in strong, agile, enduring and in tune with their bodies. The German Army blieved that fit men have a greater belief in their own abilities, and are thus more brave and aggressive, and thus better suited for Selbständichkeit- independent action based on self-confidence. A belief that US Army research these days seem to confirm, apart from the fact that heightened testosterone levels make an individual more bold and aggressive.

Final questions?

Class discussion evaluation; How was the day? Did I learn anything? Did we fulfill the purpose of the day (The participants should gain insight in Auftragstaktik, its advantages and uses in Viking Reenactment fighting)?

Auftragstaktik - Første oplæg til Palles Wargame fokuseret på dette.

Auftragstaktik. Auftragstaktik betyder direkte oversat Opgavetaktik og dækker over det fænomen, at den officer, der skal udføre opgaven, bestemmer, hvordan den skal udføres. DVS at han ikke er bundet af sin foresattes ordrer, men har frie hænder til, at udføre den som han finder bedst, idet han kender sine mænd, ressourcer og situationen bedst. Det er opfundet og udviklet af den preussiske- tyske hær efter nederlaget til Napoleon ved Jena, og for alvor gennemført og forfinet under Von Molkte d. Ældre, en af historiens største stabschefer. Auftragstaktik er en af de primære grunde til at den tyske hær i de to verdenskrige var så utroligt effektive og holdt ud længe efter ethvert håb var ude. Og generelt i perioden 1850- 1944 regnes som højdepunktet af militærvidenskab. Hvor en amerikansk kompagnichef ville få en lang og detaljeret ordre om hvordan han skulle tage en landsby, bjergtop eller lignende, og hvordan han skulle allokere sine ressourcer, ville hans tyske kollega blot få besked på, at tage den, men selv bestemme hvordan. Ligeledes blev individuelt initiativ og opportunisme i at nå målet opmuntret ned til den laveste menige soldat; hvis en gruppefører opdagede et hul i fjendens front, forventedes det, at han opgav sin oprindelige ordre for at udnytte muligheden for at nå målet for enheden som helhed. Krig er kaos, og en kommandør kan ikke styre alt- men hans folk kan have initiativ til, at gøre det. Og han kan være tæt ved fronten, ikke langt bagved, og Føre sine folk, ikke dirrigere dem. Dette krævede naturligvis veluddannede og højt motiverede officerer, men disse ville delagtiggøre deres underordnede i opgaven og hvordan man tænkte den løst, og opgaveløsningen var derfor ikke afhængig af dem. Hvis de faldt kunne enheden fungere alligevel, leutnanter kunne kommandere et regiment og Gefreitere et kompagni. Tyske officerer førte derfor fra fronten med både høj motivation hos deres underordnede og høj dødelighed til følge. Ask har ikke noget ”Kriegsakademie”, men vi kan dog lære af de effektive tyskere. Alle kan nemlig lære, at samarbejde som enhed, alle kan finde effektive sammensætninger af våben- skjold kombinationer og alle kan blive gode til at slås uden overblik. Det, der kan løfte os over de andre, der jo er ved at fange os på førnævnte områder, må nødvendigvis være krigernes mentalitet. Deres selvtillid, initiativ, overblik og fleksibilitet. Deres evne til at forstå det overordnede mål og se muligheder, for at nå det; og selv tage initiativ for at nå det, sammen med sine våbenbrødre i enheden. Uden at skulle vente på en ordre fra sin kommandør, der ofte er langt væk, måske ikke kan se, hvad der sker og under alle omstændigheder ikke kan nå, at få sin ordre frem inden muligheden er forpasset (jeg har prøvet at overse en helt åben flanke i mit fokus på at presse frem, engang jeg kommanderede Ask på Moesgård må jeg med skam melde) eller endog død. Enhver soldat har en marskalstav i sin rygsæk, sagde Napoleon, og så betyder det mindre, om kommandøren er uden for høre-/synsvidde eller endog død. Dette skal trænes så det bliver en vane. Små enheder skal altså vænnes til, at operere selvstændigt på slagmarken gennem intensiv træning. Og til dette formål har jeg både lavet et wargame og nogle øvelser til træning, hvor fokus er på initiativ, fleksibilitet, mod/selvtillid og overblik. Men alt sammen som del af en enhed, det handler om at samarbejde om, at udnytte mulighederne, for en mand batter ikke meget, men en enhed gør, og kan en mands initiativ give hans enhed en fordel, skal han gøre det og tage dem med. Udnytte Den Lille Taktik til at skabe lokal overlegenhed og angribe. Lokal overlegenhed skal altid prompte udnyttes uden at afvente ordre. Og er man i tvivl, skal man altid angribe!

Kort udkast til mine træninger i 2013/'14

Som jeg ser det er der to udfordringer at tage op på Moesgaard. Dette er ikke den fæle og frygtede Moesgaard-analyse, for jeg mangler stadig at snakke med vores fjender, men det er en brainstorm, der skal give stof til mine træninger frem mod næste år. 1. I stedet for det sædvanlige kampforløb med Formation – Sammenbrud/Kaos – reformation/sejr – sejr (læs mere om dette andetsteds). Har den nye kampform med ”løbende start” skabt en ny form for forløb: a. Kaos (men organiseret) som hærene løber på og forsøger at ”tage grund”, altså deployere i fordelagtigt terræn og blænkerne forsøger at forhindre dette eller kanalisere modstanderne bestemte steder hen (også derom kan læses andetsteds). b. Opstilling og kamp. c. Sammenbrud/Kaos d. Sejr Hvis man mestrer kaos, organiserer sig i kaos og kan samarbejde i kaos kan man fastholde initiativet og fastholde fjenden i et kaos man styrer hele vejen gennem til sejr og forhindre i hvert fald en del af hans hær i at opstille, og besejre dem i en følelse af kaos, men styret af den organiserede hær. Vi har haft succes med det et par gange, men det har også fejlet. Så dette skal vi træne og være i stand til at gøre hver gang. 2. De lange våbens dominans i formationen (i kaos er de ikke så dominerende); de lange våben er ikke blevet mindre dominerende med de nye regler, men ethåndsspyd har sluttet sig til dominansen og dominerer nok mere nu end tohåndsspyd. Og vi i Ask er begyndt at møde modstand for alvor fra andre grupper, der også er gode med de lange våben. Hvad kan man gøre ved det? Historisk er måden at besejre hære med lange våben at bruge korte våben og skjolde, som enten udmanøvrerer de lange våben (der er svære at vende) eller at gøre det vi kalder spearhunt, men i formation. I vores sport, hvor spyd kun dræber på torso, vil dette være endnu mere effektivt. Jeg tænker ikke her på enkelte, frembusende krigere- disse vil bare dø- heller ikke på Svinetryne eller kanonkugle- også disse dør for det meste, og medfører altid skader. Jeg tænker på en enhed, der går hurtigt frem som enhed; uden huller i linjen, der kan udnyttes til crossstrikes, ustoppeligt, uimodståeligt. I begge tilfælde er kodeordene initiativ, samarbejde og fleksibilitet, og fokus i mine træner er som altid på dette. Derudover skal vi selvfølgelig stadig mestre traditionel linjekamp og træne dette.

Moesgaard 2010

Now, a week after our return from Moesgaard, after confirming memories with pictures and videos, it is time for a preliminary analysis of the battles.

As I am no longer a commander, I have limited view of the entire battlefield and will thus by necessity focus on Ask. I will try to include what I can of the rest of the battles, and will gladly hear the comments of Robert, et al, who had a better view and idea of what was supposedly happening.

You should also all beware that I try to be an objective observer and analyst, so that any criticism or suggestions for improvements are not meant as degrading, but as a possible help; right or wrong, for I also am not infallible.

The sides:
“Scanlines” under Robert Dahlström, calling themselves “Tyr” for easy identification. After many years absence and longing, Scanlines were back in busines. With support from a few Poles and ?? all the Scandinavian groups were pitted on one side against the rest of the world on the other. Main groupings were Danes (including Ulfhednir, Odd, Atgeir, Loke's Frimænd, Danehirden and my own beloved Ask, sorry if I forgot anyone, I have a hard time following the mercurial developments of any groups save my own and the wolves- I know most of you in person and like you, I just find it hard to follow which groups you are in), Spydkysten/Spear Coast (an alliance of the Swedish and Norwegian groups putting much emphasis on one-handed spears, includes Ranerne, Hälsingarne, Elvegrimarne and others (Bifrost?)- again I am not current with all groups, I just like their members). I apologise for anyone not mentioned and/or forgotten, there are simply too many groups for my old brain to keep track off any longer. Total supposedly 223 fighters.

Traditionally Scanlines has been seen and proved to be too strong, but the past two- three years other groups have proven themselves while certain unnamed Scandinavian groups has proven not to be as elite as they once were. Thus, I suspect, Peter and Zuk started their tenure as “Combat-executives” thinking that Scanlines vs the rest would be even.


The rest under Swart of Einvic, calling themselves “Fenris” (or possibly “Viking”, I am not certain, I just know anything not shouting “Tyr” was a target”). Groups from as far away as Australia had joined to oppose the Scandinavians, The main groupings were the Germans (Einvic, Bernstein Ring, others?), Army of Jomsborg Elag (a large conglomerate of groups from all over, including Australia), Valhalla (a very old group that hosts wonderful parties in their camp) and the Dutch of Trek. Valhalla often serves and served as a reserve, and Trek as a small reserve, skirmishers and runners to insert through holes in the enemy line and spread havoc behind it. Total supposedly 220 fighters.

I am uncertain of the numbers for each side (220 + 223 does not add up to the 435 Peter said we were), except that Ask was the largest non-alliance single group, fielding 45 fighters and that a total of 435 fighters were on the field.



The Battles:

General introduction and points.
-Attackers come on from the beach side, Defenders from the Forests.
For safety reasons, stepping on the path in front of the audience (being kept 2 M back from it by the local Home Guard) means that you die.

-Until last year's inclusion of the small burial house in the battle (as an obstacle, its inside is off-limits as this is where medics, water-girls, etc. hides), the Attackers were generally held to have had the easiest task as the field slopes downhill and widens, especially on the line from the white stone to the house, then draws in a bit before widening slightly again after the exit to the woods in that part of the field. But these days some believe that the Defenders' side has the easiest task as they can employ the house to create a bottleneck, divide the attacking army, etc.. I am undecided on that, but more of that later.

-Since the “Inverted W” of 2007, the “Cock and Bollocks” tactic of 2008 and the “Stairway to Heaven” of 2009, everybody now uses self-supporting, self-protecting “Phalanx” formations. Squares, often made up of individual subgroups, protecting their own backs and flanks, and with their own internal small reserve to support itself. These are employed not unlike the Roman manipular tactics, but with less space in between as we do not (yet) have enough groups on the field to build a second line of overlapping groups behind the first one. This deployment is much more flexible than our traditional line, but only in the last couple of years have we had enough men on the field to deploy as such.

-For many years, metal armour and helmet has granted the wearer two lives as the Museum wished for more armour on the field. But this year the rules were revised so that everybody had only one life no matter their protection. I suspect to avoid the perpetual problems of people not being able to count well and sometimes needing seven or eight hits to acknowledge their demise. Personally I suspect cheaters will cheat in any case and that they are a minority, but it did change the strengths of the individual groups. But we will be back to that.

-When the lines engage, no orders from the overall commander can be heard. All he can do is to put the plan in motion, commit reserves and hope. The actual performance in battle is up to the initiative of subcommanders/group commanders knowing the plan and being able to improvise.

-This year, the losers of each battle was allowed to choose the role as either attacker or defender, positions in the first battle decided in a Tug-of-War Friday (amazingly with no injuries).
Often when 2 – 2 id achieved those ahead start to relax, some even give a battle to their enemies by trying very experimental tactics, etc., and generally relaxing; resting on their laurels.

-Peter and Zuk had announced during winter that as an experiment, the fight would start as soon as the first combatants entered the field. The group phalanxes/blocks would thus be important for moving around safely and effectively, as would skirmishers. This idea was dropped though, and it would probably have been boring for the audience.

Saturday Morning.
Being competitive fights, this first one would gauge the strengths of the combatants and give hints of the tactics employed by each side. The defenders were thus reluctant to leave their strong position behind the house, while the attackers were reluctant to deploy into a bottleneck. This resulted in a stand-off for some minutes while the attackers tried to lure the defenders out with obscenities, insults and a feigned attack by Ask on the right flank where they were deployed. Of note in these first minutes were Trek's skirmishing until chased off by Loke's Frimænd with support. I know they do not read Danish, but they tried to do what I describe in the post below. With little success tactically, but much morally, especially as Jaap succeeded in killing Jakob “Grimulf” of Ask, drawing first blood to much cheering from one side and much chagrin from the other. They would repeat their skirmishing and Jaap would draw first blood in all battles. But more on the skirmishers later.
The attackers' plan was to employ the “Stairway to Heaven” tactic, engaging the defenders from the right flank to the left with one phalanx after the other, the right and centre ones wearing the defenders down enough that either the right ones or Ulfhednir in reserve would break through at the left (basically an Oblique Order/Refused Flank). This plan was thwarted by the defenders' refusal to come out from behind the house and play, as we had feared.
Eventually we threw the plan to the wind; Ask on the right being hungry for blood and Robert tiring of the stand-off. Ask engaged their immediate opponents; Einvic despite their apparent strong position and a long fight ensued. Meanwhile the rest of the attackers went in slowly group-phalanx after group phalanx and as Ask started pushing Einvic back the entire lines were engaged.
On the right the Ask Bannerman noticed that the field widened slightly two metres behind Einvic and, remembering the old days where the attackers' pushing the defenders back as the field widened to go round in the resultant hole, spurred the Ask-fighters on to push their opponents back. It took a while as the large shields and defensive skills of Einvic stood up to the onslaught for a while (though not nearly as long as said Bannerman feared, more on that later). After a while the Germans were pushed back into the slightly widening part of the field, and with the losses suffered, a hole was opened for Ask to go round the flank, which decided the battle.
No reserves as such were committed against us, I seem to recall they had been used earlier to try and break through Spydkysten in the centre who, with support from Ulfhednir, contained them, pulled back and themselves broke into the enemy formation. The largest difficulty for Ask as we folded the enemy line back upon itself on its right flank was to hunt down Trek and a few other skirmishers/runners. Meanwhile the enemy commander, noticing his collapsing left flank had put a lot of pressure on our left, where the Icelanders and Poles pulled back a bit to blunt the attack, then stood their ground faithfully till the rest of us arrived; parts of Ask and Spydkysten pulling out of their advance to reinforce and the rest coming up from behind. The battle was a decisive victory for the attackers and we did not at any moment feel that it could have gone the other way.

Saturday afternoon.
Was almost a repeat of the morning battle, except that for a few moments it teetered on the brink of a defeat/more costly victory. On the right flank Ask was facing Bernstein Ring while Einvic and Valhalla were kept in reserve. As Ask pushed forwards First Einvic, then Valhalla in succession was thrown into the gap between us and our neighbours to try and isolate us from the rest of the attackers in a repeat of Napoleon's tactic at Austerlitz and the “Sickleschnitt” of 1940. For a moment Einvic almost broke through, but Ask's rearguard and our neighbours (who?), supported by Loke's Frimænd contained the attack, then Valhalla thundered in. With the line buckling, almost breaking and no reserves at hand, the battle was swinging in the defenders' direction. Then, just as everything looked lost, Christoffer led a pack of hungry Wolves in an epic charge downhill and into the flank of Valhalla. Very few things can withstand an Ulfhednir charge even from the front, and one in the flank while committed forwards is certain doom for any group, it was mass slaughter. Suddenly the hammer- anvil was turned against the defenders and their left flank melted away. With no reserves left except a few Trek runners, the battle was decided in a repeat of the morning fight and Tyr could now relax a bit Saturday evening as they could no longer loose the weekend; the worst that could happen was 2 – 2.

Sunday morning.
Sunday the Fenris/Viking side elected to now be attackers, while the confident Tyr side decided to not defend behind the house, but instead having fun and take the fight to the attackers with the right flank (still consisting of Ask) setting up far forwards and pushing hard when the battle was joined. The flanks near the audience thus met where lines did back in the days when we could barely make a full line across the field and before when we could not (we only began to be able to cover the hole field in the late 90-ties) while the flanks away from the audience met at the widest point of the field. Setting up so far forwards also gained Ask the advantage of being on level ground on a small knee of the hill, which proved an advantage later.
Ask was supposed to charge and push hard, but both in this and the subsequent afternoon fight, we did not do so. Instead we fell back in the old habit of stopping at contact, instead of merely pushing on as we did some years ago. Fortunately Bernstein Ring proved no hard opponent this time either. But as we slowed down, it allowed their two neighbouring groups to attack Ask's rear echelon to again try and isolate us from the rest, annihilate us and then flank the rest of our line, we had to hold the entire enemy flank for a while there. Only skill, cohesion, skill-full use of the house to create a killing zone between us and it and the intervention of our friends to bottle the attackers up and kill them (according to Oleg, Ulfhednir again slaughtered anything in their path), allowed us to push on slowly and grind down our enemies.
Once more our opponents kept a close order, seeking safety in a tight unit. However, as we whittled them down their bunching together opened a hole between their flank and the path, allowing Ask to send their entire mobile reserve group (which had been engaged in the containment, but could now be pulled out) of 8- 10 men all the way round that flank fast downhill to attack the main enemy line from the back and hunt down the pesky Trek runners. Meanwhile still pushing the flank back and flanking it with the main Ask line picking up speed downhill as they turned back upon themselves. Our opposition melted away and again the battle was decided by a flanking manoeuvre on the strong right flank.

Sunday afternoon.
Was almost a repeat of the morning battle, except the Fenris/Viking reserve was futilely committed against Spydkysten in the centre to break through there. Which made Ask's slowness in folding the enemy flank the worse! I believe this is a video of it just as we start.

All four battles were decisive or even overwhelming victories for Scanlines despite some hard fighting. This had several reasons.

1.Removal of the Armour Points had taken away a significant part of the non-Scandinavian side's strength. Especially from the German groups, much of their training (correct me if I am wrong) and thus apparent strength in the past two years, was based on and around moving slowly in very close formation with large shields and having two lives from armour. Some of them even refuse to train without armour with the rest of us for safety reasons (with only about 15 minor injuries in need of attention from the medic- none serious enough to stop participation in the next fight, they should not worry; this was one of the most safe Moesgaard I can recall in my 18 times there). However, the consequence of this is a static and defensive fighting style. Heavy equipment takes away much of your ability and motivation to attack vigorously. It also slows you down and tires you. Further, employing heavy armour in tight formations, instead of teaching the fighters to open up and hold the same area with fewer people in loose order when attrition sets in, allows entire groups to flank or even get around you. Which you do not want, it is much like we teach individuals on the flank to not back in a pivot in the guy next to them- effectively getting behind him- when under pressure, but instead to step to the side; catching whoever is doing the pressing in a Triangle.

2.Group Phalanxes gives added flexibility and mobility. It is easier to move as several blocks than as a large line. Both sides attempted the blocks, but the most successful ones were those of Scanlines. Ask, and I believe Spydkysten and Ulfhednir as well, has trained this tactic during winter, merely moving around in formation, protecting ourselves from runners and providing our own reserve. Drill works. However, it takes a significant number of participants and repeated training to train such with any effectiveness. Many of the non-Scandinavian groups do not have that; Army of Jomsborg is huge, but in effect an alliance made up of people from all over the world rarely meeting to train as a group whereas both Ask and Ulfhednir have most members located within 50 Km of Aarhus and Copenhagen respectively and meets twice a week to train (and Ask forces new members to train 50+ times a year). This makes a difference.

3.Trek skirmished well, but were far too few to make a difference. If Skirmishers are to perform their tasks, they need to be enough to form a credible threat and lure/channel the enemy where they want them.

4.Possession if the hill/knee of the hill proved significant in all the battles. Not so much to the melee (we are not allowed to hit heads, so height advantage is not as significant) as to deployment of reserves or mobility in the battle. It is much easier to move downhill in heat, slick grass against slick soles and full armour than it is to move uphill). This is as large an advantage as the Defenders' possession if the house.


Despite the result both sides were happy and on the non-Scandinavian side, new bonds were formed.

Points of note/conclusion for Ask: will be kept to ourselves until the powers that be in the group lets me divulge them ;-)


If others wants my comment on their performance, let me know.

Comment, clarifications, discussions and enlightenment is welcome.


Picture by Iduna Mariana Pertoft.