Dayplan
·
Intro
·
Theory
o
Historical
background
o
Principles
o
Examples
o
Uses
in viking
·
Exercises
·
Evaluation
Who am I?
Focus: ”Auftragstaktik”
Goals of participation: The participants should gain insight in
Auftragstaktik, its advantages and uses in Viking Reenactment fighting.
Litterature:
-Robert M. Citino; ”The German Way of War”
-Jörg Muth; “Command Culture”
-Mark Gerges;
"An Engineer Assualt Team Crosses the Meuse, May 1940", http://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/SixteenCasesOfMissionCommand.pdf
Prerequisites for
participation: Basic understanding of Line Fighting and ”The Little Tactic” (see Danish post further down).
Keywords are Cooperation/coordination, flexibility and initiative – which is
only achievable by communication!
Three basic Group
Circles.
Did you notice any pattern in the command and control,
and coordination in these?
Quick round; Name the three most effective militaries you
can think of historically
Brainstorm: What characterizes The Wehrmact and its
predecessors? IE; what is “The German Way of War”?
Historical background
What is
“Auftragstaktik”? Your characterization of the Wehrmacht was wrong and it rests
on stereotypes. Make no mistakes, the Wehrmacht and its predecessors had
iron-hard discipline, but not “Kadaver-Disciplin”; no, The German Way of War is
characterized by “Auftragstaktik”, or “Mission Command”. That means a freedom
of command for the responsible officer to carry out the mission as he best sees
fit. With no micromanagement from above and detailed orders. He is responsible
in all ways. Your commander does not tell you how to take a hill, he leaves
that to you, for you know the situation and your men, and as we all know any
plan changes at first contact with the enemy, and you must have the freedom to
then change it and carry it out as you see fit. The Germans did not themselves
talk of “Auftragstaktik and the above is also a misrepresentation of it, but
for now it shall suffice- I shall go more in depth later.
The central word in
The German Way of War is not Blitzkrieg, a term coined by a London
correspondent I Poland 1939, but Bewegungskrieg. And it goes back far further
than the little Austrian Corporal, back even further than Friederich der
Grösse. But it was him that was arguable the master of it and who formulated
it. Prussia, and before that the small Duchy of Brandenburg that became
Prussia, was a small, impoverished realm on the outskirts of Europe surrounded
by larger enemies such as Russia, Sweden and the Habsburg Empire, and slightly
further away the strongest country in Europe at the time; France. And with no
defensible borders. Prussia would always loose wars of attrition or defensive
wars against these larger enemies and to fight one was a slow way of losing.
Hence, Prussia would have to beat their enemies fast. Their wars needed to be
“Kurz und Wieves” as Friederich himself put it. This required the Prussian army
to outmaneuver its enemies with the goal of fighting a “Kesselschlact”;
surrounding the enemy and hitting him from all sides with extreme violence- no
starving him out as that took too long; surround and destroy. This cannot be
achieved by defending, and, again quoting Friederich; “The most certain way of
ensuring victory is to march briskly and in good order against the enemy,
always endeavouring to gain ground” or “The Prussian Army always attacks- we
would be foolish to give up the advantages of attacking; with well-trained
infantry and bold and aggressive commanders”. And up to the very end of WW2,
the Germans would have an offensive mindset; trying to defeat their enemies by
attacking them rather than to bleed them dry and inevitably very swiftly
counterattacking if forced out of a position. And always trying to achieve
Bewegungskrieg where their superior training and leadership would outweigh
their enemies’ numerical superiority: All the French, British and Soviet armies
smashed by the Wehrmacht in 1940-41-42 were superior in numbers and tanks, they
lost anyway. The Americans learned the hard way at Kasserine- the Brits had
warned saying literally, “You got to beware when fighting the Germans… they are
faster than you are used to when on exercises”. These front-loaded campaigns
would aim to annihilate the enemy fast, and you had to learn fast while
fighting them, for you often did not get a second chance- only the Soviets and
Brits did, because they had places to hide and learn.
The problem of
Bewegungskrieg before invention of radio was communication and coordination of
troops and even with radio, there is a limit to how much one person can
control. Hence, Prussia’s kings would rely on aggressive and independently
minded commanders, and they on aggressively minded subordinates, etc., and
provide them with the same training or staff officers with the same training
from the Kriegsakademie: At its best this combined independence, aggression and
intellect. Commanders making a beeline towards the enemy to outmanoeuvre and
beat him in a Kesselschlact would know that their colleagues would be doing the
same. The most famous example of this, and the ideal of later German officers,
was Friederich d. Grosse’s hyper-aggressive and hyper-independent cavalry
commander Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz, who at The Battle of Zorndorf
25-08-1758 when ordered on his head by Friedrich himself to attack and restore
the left flank for the third time instead of waiting, replyed; “After the
battle the King may do with my head as he please, but during the battle he
should let me use it to serve him as I see fit”. Not something you say to your
king, but von Seydlitz did and he won the battle decisively when his
“Fingerspitzengefühl” told him it was time to attack. He was on the spot, he
knew the situation and his men and “felt” the enemy, and his timing was perfect
because of it. And the Prussian-German officer corps was trained to lead from
the front, feel the enemy (fingerspitzengefühl), act independently and be
extremely aggressive, as you can see below.
So to sum up;
1.
The
Prussian Army always attacks – Aggression
2.
Feel
the battle; the situation and the enemy – Fingerspitzengefühl
3.
Dare
act boldly and independently without waiting for orders - Auftragstaktik
Discuss in pairs; Pros and Cons of The German Way of War
Now, let us get to
the details of Auftragstaktik
It is an old maxim of
war that every plan changes or goes out the window (at the latest) at the first
contact with the enemy. He rarely acts as you predict and it is impossible in
practice to plan for every variable of a battle. Situations in war change and
they change fast. “War is the province of uncertainty” as Clausewitz writes.
That chaos is almost impossible to control, so you should instead adapt and
embrace it, channel it and use it to beat the enemy. The German Way of War is
to do exactly that and the tool they use is commonly known as Auftragstaktik or
“Mission Command”
Auftragstaktik means
that every leader down to the lowest level has the freedom to evaluate the
situation on the ground and then change his orders if he meets a changed
situation. So he will evaluate the situation, match it to his orders, then
adapt or even change his orders to suit the situation. For example; if I send
you out to get me coffee and cake and there is no more cake, and you get me
coffee and cookies instead. You have evaluated the situation and matched it to
your orders and found that they were impossible to achieve, and done the next
best thing- without having to waste time going back to ask me, time in which
the last cookies and coffee could also be gone.
Like Blitzkrieg, it
is not an expression the Germans used themselves; they talked instead about
“Selbständichkeit”, and while Auftragstaktik means you have the freedom to
carry out your orders as you wish, Selbständichkeit means that you are free to
change them. If we continue the example from before with the coffee and cake,
you get out there and you notice there is cake, but there is also chocolate
pudding, and you know I love chocolate pudding. You should change your order
and bring me back coffee and chocolate pudding. That is Selbständichkeit. You
have changed your orders without asking me- cause the chocolate pudding would
be gone when you came back from asking- but you have succeeded because you know
what I like. You have shown Selbständichkeit and initiative. And because you
succeeded in handing me something I love, you are not punished for going against
my orders. Had you brought me cheese because you like cheese, then you would have. Or in military terms; if a
young lt. is tasked by advancing to a river crossing and up a hill overlooking
it to dig in and hold that, then notices the bridge is undefended, he should
change his orders and cross the bridge before the enemy can blow it or dig in
on the other side. He will be praised for having shown selbständichkeit and
initiative and secured a river crossing, not punished for changing his orders.
Had he come upon a strong enemy on the other side, tried to cross and suffered
heavy losses- he would be severely punished; you are allowed to go against or
change orders if you succeed in improving your side’s situation, punished
severely for failing in the face of orders.
Discuss in groups; what is Auftragstaktik; its most important
elements? What are the three most important requirements for Auftragstaktik? Using
a Kriegsakademie dialectic principle; the least experienced comments first,
then second-least, etc.
Elements of
Auftragstaktik
·
Initiative
·
Independence
·
Experience/Training
·
Knowledge
of situation and goals
·
Fingerspitzengefühl
“Innere Führung”
In order to even
attempt Auftragstaktik, you need also have “Innere Führung” or the
practitioners of it will not practice it, but just lean back. Innere Führung is
ambition, motivation, willpower, drive, the wish to excel not for yourself and
on your own, but as part of a whole, a unit, an army, a nation. The wish for it
to succeed – Sulten?
Tactical skill
There is another
essential part of this. For if the subordinate does not know his leader’s goals
and has no tactical skill, he cannot show initiative and carry it out- you
cannot get me chocolate pudding if you do not know I like it. German leaders
from 1919 and forwards were all trained to lead three levels above themselves.
That meant they knew the wishes and goals on a much higher level- and it meant
they could easily replace their superiors; German officers, leading from the
front, suffered extremely heavy casualties, but due to the training and
Five-Points Orders, that never stopped their units.
Discuss in groups; Pros and Cons of Auftragstaktik? Using a
Kriegsakademie dialectic principle; the least experienced comments first, then
second-least, etc.
How
one man won The Battle of France
An example of Auftragstaktik.
Fall Gelb was the German codeword for their attack on
France and the Low Countries. Briefly, the original intension was to copy the
Schlieffen Plan of 1914 by attacking through Belgium and along the coast. The
Allied were expecting this however, and planned to reinforce Balgium with their
best units, and gained certainty for the plan through a German officer
emergency landing in Belgium.
However, Hitler did not much like the plan, but was
not interfering with his Generals as he did later, but one of these; Erich von
Manstein were not keen on the plan either. He had another idea; one that would
give the army group he was Chief of Staff in a greater role. And he kept
pestering his superiors with this until they got so fed up that he got promoted
out of the area to silence him. He gained a third star and was sent to Poland
to command. On the way he had a meeting with Hitler, and the rest is history….
The Germans used his proposed “Sichelschnitt” to cut off the elite of the
Allied armies in Belgium and won The Battle of France in ten days! A feat their
fathers had not been able to in four years. Ten days to defeat the strongest
army in the world at the time, and doing it while outnumbered and with worse
tanks. The French lost their best divisions, and the BEF was sent scurrying
back to their island- had there been no Channel to hide behind, they would have
run all the way to Scotland.
Central for the success of this plan was the mobile
Pz-Divisions getting across the Meuse at Sedan and push to The Channel. But
Sedan was heavily fortified by bunkers with mgs and supported by artillery, and
all the bridges were blown. If the Germans were to be stopped and the
meatgrinder of 1914- 1918 repeated, this was the place. It was defended by
second-rate reserve divisions, but they were dug in well and if they could hold
to nightfall, the next day, the high-quality 3rd Army would
reinforce or counterattack. The Germans were not stopped and Western
civilization stood on the verge of destruction, but initially they succeeded,
until Auftragstaktik beat them.
The Germans were stopped
dead in 5 of 6 crossings and the elite 1st Pz Div and GD Regiment
met very heavy resistance and could not expand their bridgehead. Until…
Part of the reason they were not stopped was
Sturmpioneer Oberfeldwebel (Assault Engineer Staff Sergeant); Walther Rubart,
who crossed the river with 7 men in two dinghies as the only men of 10th Pz
division to succeed. They destroyed the French bunker firing on them, then took
stock of the situation. They were supposed to go left, but he started to
destroy the French fortifications to his right- against his order! He was being shot at from the right, saw the
heaviest resistance against crossing there, and changed his orders to fit the
situation and overall plan. And he eventually ended up cutting the French
defenders fighting against GD’s advance off. He lost all men and had to go back
for more satchel charges and reinforcements several times, but he opened the
way for the 1st PZ div and GD. He showed Selbständichkeit and Innere Führung;
seeing the necessity and not hesitating or waiting for orders. 1st Pz
and GD under Hermann von Balck then advanced, and noticing that 2nd Pz had not
crossed as evening fell, advanced against orders to take up the defensive
positions 2nd PZ were supposed to and dug in to meet a
counterattack. The French, awaiting orders and not showing Selbständichkeit,
could not react fast to the crossing and showed up late, the 3rd
army thus ran into Germans in their assembly positions and had to withdraw with
heavy losses. Balck, showing Selbständichkeit, had saved the bridgehead. The contrast
could not be greater; the Germans, trained to be selbständich and aggressive
and move fast, excelled in the chaos. The French with no such training, reacted
slow and were always a step behind the Germans. The lack of radios only made
this worse.
That is what I aim for us to reach. That every single
warrior has the tactical skill and training, and motivation to do what is
necessary for the group’s success without awaiting orders, to seize the day.
But also to be able to spot and defend a crisis point.
Feldwebel Walther Rubarth:
07-06-1913 – 26-09-1941
Uses in Viking Reenactment
fighting.
Generally low-level leadership is essential in our
fighting, the noise prevents orders from higher-ups to reach the small units in
time, the commander may not be able to see local developments and often his
role is limited to committing reserves. Often even small group commanders have
to run op behind fighters and touch them and shout in their ear to get noticed.
And leaders can fall; it is a very popular tactic to take out Igor when
fighting the Poles. And non-reserve units waiting for orders will often
squander the chance to win the battle. A few years ago Ulfhednir reacting to an
Ask outflank saved their side, while the day before Ask threw away both its
initiative and the possibility for crushing the enemy flank by procrastinating
and then withdrawing while an immediate rush on the enemy from the start would
have annihilated the flank in front of them and started to roll up the centre. Hence,
units where both low-level leaders and warriors have the ability to employ
Auftragstaktik has a greater potential to succeed. But this demands awareness,
tactical knowledge, knowledge of the plan, and boldness. Motivation to undertake
the necessary action to succeed, without blood-rush or ego taking over, but
with calculated aggression, and Fingerspitzengefühl to know when to do so.
Discussion in groups; How can we train the necessary ability?
Exercises:
-“Rundetrunte”; everybody will try commanding at least
once, preferably more.
-Trainer-Lines; One line makes a plan, but the other
(trainers) give them an opportunity to exploit. Brief feedback after each
fight; what was the weakness? How was it
exploited?
Walk and Talk; reflections
– how can I employ Auftragstaktik? What can I do to further it in my group?
Why do I show a picture of these two handsome and smiling chaps? Apart from the fact that they are handsoms, smiling, nice and we all like them, so it is always a pleasure to look at them?
They keep fit! Not "lifting-heavy-stuff-fit", but fit as in strong, agile, enduring and in tune with their bodies. The German Army blieved that fit men have a greater belief in their own abilities, and are thus more brave and aggressive, and thus better suited for Selbständichkeit- independent action based on self-confidence. A belief that US Army research these days seem to confirm, apart from the fact that heightened testosterone levels make an individual more bold and aggressive.
Final questions?
Class discussion evaluation; How was the day? Did I learn anything? Did we fulfill the purpose of
the day (The
participants should gain insight in Auftragstaktik, its advantages and uses in
Viking Reenactment fighting)?
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