Baggrund

Velkommen til.

De oprindelige tanker her er nedskrevet i 2004- 2005 efter at have været leget med 1997- 2003 og delvist testet på Moesbork, for at formulere dem til forbedrelse af Asks indsats ved at udnytte den enkelte bedst muligt. Og for at overbevise de tøvende.

Mange var nemlig bange for at vi ved at benytte faste enheder ville svække vores indsats med andre end vores kampgruppe-partner. Dette viste sig ikke at være tilfældet, men i sidste ende blev dette, der resulterede i Dyregrupperne 2005- 2007, gennemført fordi Martin Seliger og jeg valgte at ignorere indsigelserne og i samarbejde med Mikkel som træningsofficer gøre det.

Der er siden sket andre ting og udviklinger, men meget af dette er stadig relevant og ikke mindst brugbart for andre. Nogle af tankerne undervejs i udviklingen da bolden for alvor begyndte at rulle nåede aldrig at blive skrevet ned, men disse er i hvert fald gemt.

Sunday, 1 October 2017

Palle’s Way of Viking War


We must always aim to annihilate the enemy; to kill him with as few losses as possible. This is best achieved from behind, where they cannot defend themselves and attack us. Hence the desired end state is to outmanoeuvre the enemy, to kill his reserves and commanders so the main line is isolated and insecure and alone, and then to catch them in a kesselschlacht and kill them, hemming them in, will also hinder their ability to fight.
On an open battlefield we should thus always aim to flank or double envelop the enemy, if for no other reason; to concentrate force locally in a schwerpunkt and defeat him with local superiority while holding elsewhere. Yet the desired result must be to flank, and surround him in a kessel and annihilate him.

On a closed battlefield like Moesgaard or where the enemy’s flanks are otherwise anchored safely, the possibility to flank him is not present. We must thus create a hole in the enemy line by concentrating force in a schwerpunkt (Klotzen nicht Kleckern), punch through, and penetrate his rear areas as described above, while at the same time rolling up his flanks on the “shoulder” of the penetration point. This Schwerpunkt is chosen by the commander, but- and this is important- any warrior who sees the opportunity to break through locally or create a Schwerpunkt locally, must always do so at his own initiative. But more on that later.

In any case, if we are to achieve a breakthrough, we cannot do so defensively and passively. We must show initiative and aggression under any and all circumstances, wars are not won by defending, and a group with well-trained warriors must employ them to the fullest. As our standard is fairly high and the expectations on us usually high as well, we would be foolish to not attack. Loitering is not for us, we must attack and kill the enemy, not just stand around waiting for others to decide the fight or the enemy to make a mistake. We must attack him, create a favourable situation for us and punch through to catch him in a Kesselschlacht. Or die epicly in the effort.

This aggression and initiative demands cooperation with and trust in your brothers-in-arms on the line. To cooperate effectively makes us much stronger than an equal number of individuals. Allow me to elaborate.
By cooperating with others, your back is covered in most situations as you stand on line, facing the enemy, to avoid being killed from behind. Equally, on a line you should worry less about cross-strikes coming in from your front sides, as your mates will parry these for you and you for them. These are otherwise dangerous, as the human eye has a harder time noticing peripheral movement and you cannot see attacks from behind, while you easily spot the enemy opposite you moving and striking. You must thus parry these and direct them away from your friends next to you. This cannot be stressed enough. And with your back and sides covered, you can focus on protecting your front and stop the enemy’s attacks against your friends as well as- most importantly- killing him and his friends. So the protection from your friends allow you freedom to feint, distract, confuse and kill the enemy in cooperation with your friends. Creating openings for the fighters right and left of you, for as mentioned; peripheral vision has a harder time spotting movements than frontal vision, so cross-strikes are more effective. This is enhanced also, by the frontal coverage of the shield, which extends to a lesser extent to the front’s sides. And can be entirely removed by cooperation with your mates to attract the enemy focus and feint and lure the enemy shield out of the way for your cross-strike.
Hence it is most effective to fight in cooperation to lure the direct opposition’s attention and focus away from your mates to the left while you ready yourself to strike the enemy to your right. Most people are right-handed and you will thus have a larger uncovered area to strike on their right side than on their shield side, just as your attacks to your right leave less of an opening than to the left. If you use a one-handed weapon that is. Your enemy will thus often briefly face many weapons and strikes as you and the warriors to your sides cooperate on the line to create small “Triangles” or local Schwerpunkts flexibly in your surrounding and kill the enemy with this brief local superiority by cross-strikes.
Often this required cooperation to briefly focus several weapons on a single target happens by coincidence, at other times it is the result of communication. What we should aim for, is that it must always be the result of communication, and ultimately to know your group-mates so well, that the communication can be silent or in very few words. This is one of the strongest arguments for settled and organised groups; most of us simply do not know the other 70 fighters so well that we can cooperate effectively with them even if we communicate.
We must also not forget the psychological effects to fight in a group of friends you know well. Not just do most people feel stronger and safer as a group, but the knowledge of your mates’ style and fighting spirit and the sense of esprit de corps must never be underestimated.
So to sum up;
If we cannot flank or envelop an enemy, we must weaken him from the point of contact by effective cooperation on the line, for a vulnerability for a Schwerpunkt can be created and exploited for a breakthrough to kill his rear area, surround him and annihilate him in a Kesselschlacht. But the essential thing is initiative, flexibility and aggression in cooperation with your friends to kill the enemies in front of you. To step into the Danger-Zone and never let up and “snipe”, but to at least appear active and threatening, striking and feinting all the time. To keep up the initiative by pressure and aggression and never let the enemy rest before he is dead.

How to achieve this initiative in Viking Fighting?
Generally low-level leadership is essential in our fighting, the noise prevents orders from higher-ups to reach the small units in time, the commander may not be able to see local developments and often his role is limited to committing reserves. Often even small group commanders have to run op behind fighters and touch them and shout in their ear to get noticed. And leaders can fall; it is a very popular tactic to take out Igor when fighting the Poles. And non-reserve units waiting for orders will often squander the chance to win the battle. A few years ago Ulfhednir reacting to an Ask outflank saved their side, while the day before Ask threw away both its initiative and the possibility for crushing the enemy flank by procrastinating and then withdrawing while an immediate rush on the enemy from the start would have annihilated the flank in front of them and started to roll up the centre. Hence, units where both low-level leaders and warriors have the ability to employ Auftragstaktik has a greater potential to succeed. But this demands awareness, tactical knowledge, knowledge of the plan, and boldness. Motivation to undertake the necessary action to succeed, without blood-rush or ego taking over, but with calculated aggression, and Fingerspitzengefühl to know when to do so.


It is an old maxim of war that every plan changes or goes out the window (at the latest) at the first contact with the enemy. He rarely acts as you predict and it is impossible in practice to plan for every variable of a battle. Situations in war change and they change fast. “War is the province of uncertainty” as Clausewitz writes. That chaos is almost impossible to control, so you should instead adapt and embrace it, channel it and use it to beat the enemy. The German Way of War is to do exactly that and the tool they use is commonly known as Auftragstaktik or “Mission Command”
Auftragstaktik means that every leader down to the lowest level has the freedom to evaluate the situation on the ground and then change his orders if he meets a changed situation. So he will evaluate the situation, match it to his orders, then adapt or even change his orders to suit the situation. For example; if I send you out to get me coffee and cake and there is no more cake, and you get me coffee and cookies instead. You have evaluated the situation and matched it to your orders and found that they were impossible to achieve, and done the next best thing- without having to waste time going back to ask me, time in which the last cookies and coffee could also be gone.
Like Blitzkrieg, it is not an expression the Germans used themselves; they talked instead about “Selbständichkeit”, and while Auftragstaktik means you have the freedom to carry out your orders as you wish, Selbständichkeit means that you are free to change them. If we continue the example from before with the coffee and cake, you get out there and you notice there is cake, but there is also chocolate pudding, and you know I love chocolate pudding. You should change your order and bring me back coffee and chocolate pudding. That is Selbständichkeit. You have changed your orders without asking me- cause the chocolate pudding would be gone when you came back from asking- but you have succeeded because you know what I like. You have shown Selbständichkeit and initiative. And because you succeeded in handing me something I love, you are not punished for going against my orders. Had you brought me cheese because you like cheese, then you would have. Or in military terms; if a young lt. is tasked by advancing to a river crossing and up a hill overlooking it to dig in and hold that, then notices the bridge is undefended, he should change his orders and cross the bridge before the enemy can blow it or dig in on the other side. He will be praised for having shown selbständichkeit and initiative and secured a river crossing, not punished for changing his orders. Had he come upon a strong enemy on the other side, tried to cross and suffered heavy losses- he would be severely punished; you are allowed to go against or change orders if you succeed in improving your side’s situation, punished severely for failing in the face of orders.
Hence, the subordinates - down to the youngest private - must know what is desirable for his organisation, without having to ask. You only gain this through thorough education and training- through having thinking soldiers.



How to protect your mate against cross-strikes when you use a spear? There is only one way, especially with a one-hander that should always own an opposing two-hander; attack him as soon as he even thinks of moving. You have a nice shield to hide behind and can hardly be hit by twohanders, but you can step into and kill them. So do not fear; hit or threaten him as soon as he tries to strike. We must remember this or we must have more swords and axes on the line.


What do these two have in common?
Both go to great length to have a fit body- not a pumped body, but a fit, agile and strong one. The Germans believed that a strong, fit body added to both bravery and self-confidence, and thus the “selbständichkeit” and initiative of the individual commander. Ongoing research by the US Army seems to confirm this. So; keep fit!


Leaders must possess initiative, aggression, tactical skill, timing and serve to serve; their command should not be about them and self-serving, but they about their command and unselfishly serving.

Saturday, 5 August 2017

Moesgaard 2017



Now, a week after our return from Moesgaard, after confirming memories with pictures and videos, it is time for a preliminary analysis of the battles; the largest yet in its 40 years of history, with 610 warriors participating.


As I am no longer a commander, I have limited view of the entire battlefield and will thus by necessity focus on Ask. I will try to include what I can of the rest of the battles, and will gladly hear the comments of anyone who had a better view and idea of what was supposedly happening.


You should also all beware that I try to be an objective observer and analyst, so that any criticism or suggestions for improvements are not meant as degrading (I am no diplomat), but as a possible help; right or wrong, for I also am not infallible.


For a description of the terrain, see here, and the pictures below. In combination with the weather, this would prove significant.


Briefly, the best viking reenactment fighters globally in the "Western Style" fighting meet as part of Moesgaard Viking Market for a week every year. Here we train and exchange new methods and ideas (and drink and boast and wench) during the four days leading up to the weekend, with Friday being reserved for a division into two sides of equal strength and a few test fights, then culminating during the weekend with four large battles and four "circles" (every man for himself in a huge melee till only one is left standing). The winners of these battles and circles are the unofficial world champions for a year. And just as not all individual fighetrs are equally strong, not all groups are- not to mention size as they range from one to 117 present fighters- so it is a difficult task; not least because three large and two medium/small groups are usually considered stronger than the others.
These are in order of size:
  1. Ask (Aarhus, my group), 57 fighters present.
  2. Ulfhednir (Cph, our best friends and worst rivals), appr. 35 figthers.
  3. Einwik (Germany, I can never spell it right), also appr. 35 fighters
  4. Trek (Holland), appr. 15 fighters.
  5. Atgeir (Sjælland), appr. 15 fighters.

 The Battlefield
  1. The Battlefield itself
  2. The reconstructed Stone Age Burial House
  3. The "Knee" a small hillock.
  4. Entrance for the Forest Side
  5. Entrance for the Beach Side
  6.  the small red dots are photo 

Entire market and combat area
  • A is the beach side muster-site
  • B is the forest side muster-site.
  • C + beach is the market
  • D is the audience area during the shows
 The exit from the forest side muster-site (B)

 First part of the march route from the forest muster, 
appr. from adge of photo above.

 The hill seen distantly on the photo above.

 And the path down from it...

 And down to its worst part

 Muddy tracks, slippery authentic soles

 The soles close up

 Entrance from forest, view towards the Burial House

 further up the field from the forest

 From the small "knee" on the field and down across it at it widest point

 The same location towards the beach

 From the beach entrance towards the burial House

 Same location, towards the beach, firm but sligthly narrow path.
the bridge across the stream seen below 
is at a 90 degree angle on this path, down where the people are loitering

 The march route from the beach side mustering point to the path above. 
Firm, nice gravel.


With the sides split, Ask was on one side, with the other four strong groups as our opponents, with us we had the huge Army of Jomsborg (117 fighters, from subgroups of the same major group spread across various nations, but thus not used to fight in a large group) and small groups from Ireland, Scandinavia - including Denmark- and Germany (that I know of, there were likely more groups I do not know) of varying strength. On the other side our opponents also included Icelanders, other Danes and Germans (again that I know off).
There were Austrians, Italians and French as well, but I am uncertain where they fought. 
Judging from the week's fighting and our estimation of sides, things looked bleak for Ask, our main ally was not used to fight as a group and as we did not actually feel our best we expected to loose, but to give it our very- VERY best before we fell. Our beloved and hated Wolves (Ulfhednir) spent Friday evening celebrating their impending victory, or at least felt very secure they would win.

Our side won the contest (often tug-of-war) on Friday to choose where to muster in the first battle, and our Norwegian General decided to muster on the Beach Side.

Saturday Morning Battle

The plan was to deploy Ask on the left and use us as a hammer to grind away the enemy, while the rest of our line provided a hammer. Then when we had thinned out the enemy, the Norwegian groups allied as Nord would break through as our reserve.

However, as Clausewitz noted; "war is the province of uncertainty" and our reserve never showed up. I hear from one of the Norwegians that The Army of Jomsborg deployed in such density that Nord had to close a hole between them and the other groups in the front line, but as The Army was left of and behind us as we pushed forwards strongly, I cannot verify this- in light of later events, it sounds likely though.
So now we were supposed to attrit the enemy, create a hole and break through it. And it started out slow. There are pros and cons to our numerous one-handed spears, and at the start it seemed to me as bannerbearer that we were not pushing strongly and offensively enough. Our enemies had deployed only one of their strong groups, either Trek or Atgeir (I cannot recall), against us and were pushing hard on our far left in front of the audience (I am as yet unaware of their plan). The battle was thus quite Hellene with both right flanks pushing hard. Eventually we broke through the enemy and started both rolling up the enemy and "liberating" our left flank by running up (and uphill) behind and round the Burial House and hitting them in the back.

We had no left flank left though, it had collapsed, and as we engaged, most of Einwik turned with others (I presume reserves) and we faced a really hard faight against strong enemies who we love to fight as they are a hell of a challenge, but who we can usually not kill fast, and who can sometimes beat us. This time we pushed through them though, our right flank maintaining its momentum and pushing forwards. The battle had turned 180 degrees and some of thought we were now done, but I looked up and to the left as we pushed through their remnants and saw Ulfhednir and their remaining friends down where we started, having killed our last friends and forming up to hit us in the flank. Ask and our surviving friends faced a really hard and equal struggle yet if we were to pull victory from the grasp of defeat.


Here are some of them in a posed picture, nice guys- really- but not what you want to see coming at you after fighting through the enemy line twice and running uphill.

Yet our blood was up, we had momentum and we would let nothing stop us. We rallied as we moved downhill to fight them and as the remnants of two major Danish group, reinforced by our surviving friends faced off they probably stood no chance; their expected certain victory had turned into a hard fight and our expected defeat had turned into a slaughter of anyone who faced us.

It was a hard fight still, but eventually the heroic Wolves fell and the "King" of that side was killed to the cheers of the audience. The "dead" were resurrected by Odin, and the following "Circle" was won by Thomas Smith from Ulfhednir (training and living with us in Aarhus though), they are very good individual fighters too.

So snatching victory from the jaws of defeat, Ask and our side were happy. We believe, as one of our Norwegian allies said it; that it was Ask winning that battle. We often do well, and the tactic is often that we are to win the battle, which is a bit risky, for if we do bad (as happens) or the enemy finds a way to neutralise us our line is also neutralised and very few viking reenactment groups practice Auftragstaktik, though I try to change that.







Monday, 6 March 2017

Palle's Workshop on Auftragstaktik for Ask International Training 2017 - Unedited, unclarified

Dayplan
·         Intro
·         Theory
o   Historical background
o   Principles
o   Examples
o   Uses in viking
·         Exercises
·         Evaluation

Who am I?

Focus: ”Auftragstaktik”

Goals of participation: The participants should gain insight in Auftragstaktik, its advantages and uses in Viking Reenactment fighting.

Litterature:
-Robert M. Citino; ”The German Way of War”
-Jörg Muth; “Command Culture”
-Mark Gerges; "An Engineer Assualt Team Crosses the Meuse, May 1940", http://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/SixteenCasesOfMissionCommand.pdf


Prerequisites for participation: Basic understanding of Line Fighting and ”The Little Tactic” (see Danish post further down). Keywords are Cooperation/coordination, flexibility and initiative – which is only achievable by communication!


Three basic Group Circles.
Did you notice any pattern in the command and control, and coordination in these?

Quick round; Name the three most effective militaries you can think of historically
Brainstorm: What characterizes The Wehrmact and its predecessors? IE; what is “The German Way of War”?



Historical background
What is “Auftragstaktik”? Your characterization of the Wehrmacht was wrong and it rests on stereotypes. Make no mistakes, the Wehrmacht and its predecessors had iron-hard discipline, but not “Kadaver-Disciplin”; no, The German Way of War is characterized by “Auftragstaktik”, or “Mission Command”. That means a freedom of command for the responsible officer to carry out the mission as he best sees fit. With no micromanagement from above and detailed orders. He is responsible in all ways. Your commander does not tell you how to take a hill, he leaves that to you, for you know the situation and your men, and as we all know any plan changes at first contact with the enemy, and you must have the freedom to then change it and carry it out as you see fit. The Germans did not themselves talk of “Auftragstaktik and the above is also a misrepresentation of it, but for now it shall suffice- I shall go more in depth later.




The central word in The German Way of War is not Blitzkrieg, a term coined by a London correspondent I Poland 1939, but Bewegungskrieg. And it goes back far further than the little Austrian Corporal, back even further than Friederich der Grösse. But it was him that was arguable the master of it and who formulated it. Prussia, and before that the small Duchy of Brandenburg that became Prussia, was a small, impoverished realm on the outskirts of Europe surrounded by larger enemies such as Russia, Sweden and the Habsburg Empire, and slightly further away the strongest country in Europe at the time; France. And with no defensible borders. Prussia would always loose wars of attrition or defensive wars against these larger enemies and to fight one was a slow way of losing. Hence, Prussia would have to beat their enemies fast. Their wars needed to be “Kurz und Wieves” as Friederich himself put it. This required the Prussian army to outmaneuver its enemies with the goal of fighting a “Kesselschlact”; surrounding the enemy and hitting him from all sides with extreme violence- no starving him out as that took too long; surround and destroy. This cannot be achieved by defending, and, again quoting Friederich; “The most certain way of ensuring victory is to march briskly and in good order against the enemy, always endeavouring to gain ground” or “The Prussian Army always attacks- we would be foolish to give up the advantages of attacking; with well-trained infantry and bold and aggressive commanders”. And up to the very end of WW2, the Germans would have an offensive mindset; trying to defeat their enemies by attacking them rather than to bleed them dry and inevitably very swiftly counterattacking if forced out of a position. And always trying to achieve Bewegungskrieg where their superior training and leadership would outweigh their enemies’ numerical superiority: All the French, British and Soviet armies smashed by the Wehrmacht in 1940-41-42 were superior in numbers and tanks, they lost anyway. The Americans learned the hard way at Kasserine- the Brits had warned saying literally, “You got to beware when fighting the Germans… they are faster than you are used to when on exercises”. These front-loaded campaigns would aim to annihilate the enemy fast, and you had to learn fast while fighting them, for you often did not get a second chance- only the Soviets and Brits did, because they had places to hide and learn.
The problem of Bewegungskrieg before invention of radio was communication and coordination of troops and even with radio, there is a limit to how much one person can control. Hence, Prussia’s kings would rely on aggressive and independently minded commanders, and they on aggressively minded subordinates, etc., and provide them with the same training or staff officers with the same training from the Kriegsakademie: At its best this combined independence, aggression and intellect. Commanders making a beeline towards the enemy to outmanoeuvre and beat him in a Kesselschlact would know that their colleagues would be doing the same. The most famous example of this, and the ideal of later German officers, was Friederich d. Grosse’s hyper-aggressive and hyper-independent cavalry commander Friedrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz, who at The Battle of Zorndorf 25-08-1758 when ordered on his head by Friedrich himself to attack and restore the left flank for the third time instead of waiting, replyed; “After the battle the King may do with my head as he please, but during the battle he should let me use it to serve him as I see fit”. Not something you say to your king, but von Seydlitz did and he won the battle decisively when his “Fingerspitzengefühl” told him it was time to attack. He was on the spot, he knew the situation and his men and “felt” the enemy, and his timing was perfect because of it. And the Prussian-German officer corps was trained to lead from the front, feel the enemy (fingerspitzengefühl), act independently and be extremely aggressive, as you can see below.


So to sum up;
1.    The Prussian Army always attacks – Aggression
2.    Feel the battle; the situation and the enemy – Fingerspitzengefühl
3.    Dare act boldly and independently without waiting for orders - Auftragstaktik

Discuss in pairs; Pros and Cons of The German Way of War


Now, let us get to the details of Auftragstaktik
It is an old maxim of war that every plan changes or goes out the window (at the latest) at the first contact with the enemy. He rarely acts as you predict and it is impossible in practice to plan for every variable of a battle. Situations in war change and they change fast. “War is the province of uncertainty” as Clausewitz writes. That chaos is almost impossible to control, so you should instead adapt and embrace it, channel it and use it to beat the enemy. The German Way of War is to do exactly that and the tool they use is commonly known as Auftragstaktik or “Mission Command”
Auftragstaktik means that every leader down to the lowest level has the freedom to evaluate the situation on the ground and then change his orders if he meets a changed situation. So he will evaluate the situation, match it to his orders, then adapt or even change his orders to suit the situation. For example; if I send you out to get me coffee and cake and there is no more cake, and you get me coffee and cookies instead. You have evaluated the situation and matched it to your orders and found that they were impossible to achieve, and done the next best thing- without having to waste time going back to ask me, time in which the last cookies and coffee could also be gone.
Like Blitzkrieg, it is not an expression the Germans used themselves; they talked instead about “Selbständichkeit”, and while Auftragstaktik means you have the freedom to carry out your orders as you wish, Selbständichkeit means that you are free to change them. If we continue the example from before with the coffee and cake, you get out there and you notice there is cake, but there is also chocolate pudding, and you know I love chocolate pudding. You should change your order and bring me back coffee and chocolate pudding. That is Selbständichkeit. You have changed your orders without asking me- cause the chocolate pudding would be gone when you came back from asking- but you have succeeded because you know what I like. You have shown Selbständichkeit and initiative. And because you succeeded in handing me something I love, you are not punished for going against my orders. Had you brought me cheese because you like cheese, then you would have. Or in military terms; if a young lt. is tasked by advancing to a river crossing and up a hill overlooking it to dig in and hold that, then notices the bridge is undefended, he should change his orders and cross the bridge before the enemy can blow it or dig in on the other side. He will be praised for having shown selbständichkeit and initiative and secured a river crossing, not punished for changing his orders. Had he come upon a strong enemy on the other side, tried to cross and suffered heavy losses- he would be severely punished; you are allowed to go against or change orders if you succeed in improving your side’s situation, punished severely for failing in the face of orders.

Discuss in groups; what is Auftragstaktik; its most important elements? What are the three most important requirements for Auftragstaktik? Using a Kriegsakademie dialectic principle; the least experienced comments first, then second-least, etc.
Elements of Auftragstaktik
·         Initiative
·         Independence
·         Experience/Training
·         Knowledge of situation and goals
·         Fingerspitzengefühl

“Innere Führung”
In order to even attempt Auftragstaktik, you need also have “Innere Führung” or the practitioners of it will not practice it, but just lean back. Innere Führung is ambition, motivation, willpower, drive, the wish to excel not for yourself and on your own, but as part of a whole, a unit, an army, a nation. The wish for it to succeed – Sulten?

Tactical skill
There is another essential part of this. For if the subordinate does not know his leader’s goals and has no tactical skill, he cannot show initiative and carry it out- you cannot get me chocolate pudding if you do not know I like it. German leaders from 1919 and forwards were all trained to lead three levels above themselves. That meant they knew the wishes and goals on a much higher level- and it meant they could easily replace their superiors; German officers, leading from the front, suffered extremely heavy casualties, but due to the training and Five-Points Orders, that never stopped their units.

Discuss in groups; Pros and Cons of Auftragstaktik? Using a Kriegsakademie dialectic principle; the least experienced comments first, then second-least, etc.



How one man won The Battle of France
An example of Auftragstaktik.
Fall Gelb was the German codeword for their attack on France and the Low Countries. Briefly, the original intension was to copy the Schlieffen Plan of 1914 by attacking through Belgium and along the coast. The Allied were expecting this however, and planned to reinforce Balgium with their best units, and gained certainty for the plan through a German officer emergency landing in Belgium.
However, Hitler did not much like the plan, but was not interfering with his Generals as he did later, but one of these; Erich von Manstein were not keen on the plan either. He had another idea; one that would give the army group he was Chief of Staff in a greater role. And he kept pestering his superiors with this until they got so fed up that he got promoted out of the area to silence him. He gained a third star and was sent to Poland to command. On the way he had a meeting with Hitler, and the rest is history…. The Germans used his proposed “Sichelschnitt” to cut off the elite of the Allied armies in Belgium and won The Battle of France in ten days! A feat their fathers had not been able to in four years. Ten days to defeat the strongest army in the world at the time, and doing it while outnumbered and with worse tanks. The French lost their best divisions, and the BEF was sent scurrying back to their island- had there been no Channel to hide behind, they would have run all the way to Scotland.

Central for the success of this plan was the mobile Pz-Divisions getting across the Meuse at Sedan and push to The Channel. But Sedan was heavily fortified by bunkers with mgs and supported by artillery, and all the bridges were blown. If the Germans were to be stopped and the meatgrinder of 1914- 1918 repeated, this was the place. It was defended by second-rate reserve divisions, but they were dug in well and if they could hold to nightfall, the next day, the high-quality 3rd Army would reinforce or counterattack. The Germans were not stopped and Western civilization stood on the verge of destruction, but initially they succeeded, until Auftragstaktik beat them.
The Germans were stopped dead in 5 of 6 crossings and the elite 1st Pz Div and GD Regiment met very heavy resistance and could not expand their bridgehead. Until…






Part of the reason they were not stopped was Sturmpioneer Oberfeldwebel (Assault Engineer Staff Sergeant); Walther Rubart, who crossed the river with 7 men in two dinghies as the only men of 10th Pz division to succeed. They destroyed the French bunker firing on them, then took stock of the situation. They were supposed to go left, but he started to destroy the French fortifications to his right- against his order! He was being shot at from the right, saw the heaviest resistance against crossing there, and changed his orders to fit the situation and overall plan. And he eventually ended up cutting the French defenders fighting against GD’s advance off. He lost all men and had to go back for more satchel charges and reinforcements several times, but he opened the way for the 1st PZ div and GD. He showed Selbständichkeit and Innere Führung; seeing the necessity and not hesitating or waiting for orders. 1st Pz and GD under Hermann von Balck then advanced, and noticing that 2nd Pz had not crossed as evening fell, advanced against orders to take up the defensive positions 2nd PZ were supposed to and dug in to meet a counterattack. The French, awaiting orders and not showing Selbständichkeit, could not react fast to the crossing and showed up late, the 3rd army thus ran into Germans in their assembly positions and had to withdraw with heavy losses. Balck, showing Selbständichkeit, had saved the bridgehead. The contrast could not be greater; the Germans, trained to be selbständich and aggressive and move fast, excelled in the chaos. The French with no such training, reacted slow and were always a step behind the Germans. The lack of radios only made this worse.

That is what I aim for us to reach. That every single warrior has the tactical skill and training, and motivation to do what is necessary for the group’s success without awaiting orders, to seize the day. But also to be able to spot and defend a crisis point.
Feldwebel Walther Rubarth: 07-06-1913 – 26-09-1941


Uses in Viking Reenactment fighting.
Generally low-level leadership is essential in our fighting, the noise prevents orders from higher-ups to reach the small units in time, the commander may not be able to see local developments and often his role is limited to committing reserves. Often even small group commanders have to run op behind fighters and touch them and shout in their ear to get noticed. And leaders can fall; it is a very popular tactic to take out Igor when fighting the Poles. And non-reserve units waiting for orders will often squander the chance to win the battle. A few years ago Ulfhednir reacting to an Ask outflank saved their side, while the day before Ask threw away both its initiative and the possibility for crushing the enemy flank by procrastinating and then withdrawing while an immediate rush on the enemy from the start would have annihilated the flank in front of them and started to roll up the centre. Hence, units where both low-level leaders and warriors have the ability to employ Auftragstaktik has a greater potential to succeed. But this demands awareness, tactical knowledge, knowledge of the plan, and boldness. Motivation to undertake the necessary action to succeed, without blood-rush or ego taking over, but with calculated aggression, and Fingerspitzengefühl to know when to do so.

Discussion in groups; How can we train the necessary ability?

Exercises:
-“Rundetrunte”; everybody will try commanding at least once, preferably more.
-Trainer-Lines; One line makes a plan, but the other (trainers) give them an opportunity to exploit. Brief feedback after each fight; what was the weakness? How was it exploited?

Walk and Talk; reflections – how can I employ Auftragstaktik? What can I do to further it in my group?




Why do I show a picture of these two handsome and smiling chaps? Apart from the fact that they are handsoms, smiling, nice and we all like them, so it is always a pleasure to look at them?

They keep fit! Not "lifting-heavy-stuff-fit", but fit as in strong, agile, enduring and in tune with their bodies. The German Army blieved that fit men have a greater belief in their own abilities, and are thus more brave and aggressive, and thus better suited for Selbständichkeit- independent action based on self-confidence. A belief that US Army research these days seem to confirm, apart from the fact that heightened testosterone levels make an individual more bold and aggressive.

Final questions?

Class discussion evaluation; How was the day? Did I learn anything? Did we fulfill the purpose of the day (The participants should gain insight in Auftragstaktik, its advantages and uses in Viking Reenactment fighting)?